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UNFAIR COMPETITION: APPROPRIATION OF TRADE
SECRETS HELD TO CONSTITUTE CONTINUING TORT
FOR PURPOSE OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FDING no dispositive precedent on the point in issue, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Underwater Storage, Inc.
v. United States Rubber Co.' held that even though the statute of
limitations had run on the original taking of a trade secret, the mis-
appropriators were still amenable to suit in tort for each use of the
secret within the statutory period of limitations immediately pre-
ceding the initiation of the action. The developer alleged that
United States Rubber Co. had unlawfully acquired an underwater
system for the storage of strategic materials developed in 1958 by
obtaining knowledge of the system from a person to whom the
information had been entrusted in confidence. Two years later
the developer became aware of the unlawful acquisition when
the alleged misappropriator published the trade secret, but no com-
plaint was filed until. 1964. United States Rubber Co. moved for
summary judgment pursuant to rule 56,2 asserting that the de-
veloper's claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations
on tort actions.3 Accordingly, the district court defined the issue
as whether a misappropriator's use of a trade secret constitutes a
continuing tort or whether the wrong is complete at the time of the
original taking of the secret. The court held that the tort lay in the
wrongful acquisition and, consequently, that the action was barred
by the three-year limitation period. Subsequently, the court of
appeals reversed.
Generally, a trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device, or data which gives the developer an opportunity to gain an
advantage over competitors who are not privy to the information.4
The law provides protection for trade secrets because of a prevailing
public policy which demands fair dealing in business relationships.
',151 U.S.P.Q. 90 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 859 (1967).
2 FED. R. Crv. P. 56.
' D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-201 (1961).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). See generally ELLIS, TRADE SECREMS
§§ 1-37, 66-82, 181-223 (1953).
5 See E. I. duPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917);
ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS § 8 (1953). See generally Cummings, Some Aspects of Trade
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On a practical plane, the courts implement this policy by striking a
balance between the need to facilitate mobility of ideas and the
desire to give reasonable security to the owner against unauthorized
use or acquisition of his trade secrets by former confidants or com-
petitors.0 The courts favor mobility of ideas when the secret is dis-
covered or disclosed by proper means which do not evidence an intent
to deprive an owner of his exclusive processesY On the other hand,
the balance is struck in favor of the owner's right to protection if
the secret is obtained by theft, bribery, stealth, breach of a con-
fidential relationship, or other similar mea ns which may fairly be
characterized as "unlawful."8 In the latter circumstance, the im-
proper acquisition does not deprive the secret of its confidential
nature and protected status.9 Beyond these seemingly settled equi-
table principles, however, is the conceptual nature of the wrong,
a question which becomes crucial when, as in Underwater Storage,
an issue arises as to the applicable statute of limitations.
Statutes of limitations are basically designed to keep stale and
vexatious claims out of court.10 Therefore, if an injured party does
not bring suit within a fixed period of time after the harm occurs,
he is forever barred. 1 The critical determination thus becomes the
Secrets and Their Protection: The Public Domain and the "Unified Description" Re-
quirement, 54 KY. L.J. 190 (1965).
C See Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 157 (2d
Cir. 1949); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 564 (D. Conn. 1964);
Tempo Instrument, Inc. v. Logitek, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). See gen-
erally Schatzel, The Trade Secret Dilemma-Employers Beware: Are You Hiring an
Employee or an Employee and a Law Suit?, 38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 311, 312 (1966).
7 See Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
Marcuse, The Protection of Trade Secrets: Theory and Practice, 36 CONN. B.J. 348,
348-51 (1962).
8 Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, supra note 7, at 147; see, e.g., RESTATEMENT,
ToRTs § 757, comment a (1939); Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 Omo ST. L.J. 4, 5-8 (1962).
' See Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104, 106 (7th Cir. 1936);
Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HiARv. L. Ray. 888, 948-49, 953-55
(1964); cf. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236-40 (1918).
20 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938); McDonald v. United States, 315 F.2d 796, 801
(6th Cir. 1963); see, e.g., Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672
(1913); Federal Reserve Bank v. Atlanta Trust Co., 91 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 738 (1937).
31 See, e.g., Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp.
v. United States, 265 F.2d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1959); Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 146
F.2d 889, 896 (3d Cir. 1944); Federal Reserve Bank v. Atlanta Trust Co., 91 F.2d 283,
286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 738 (1937); REsrATEmE.NT, TORTs § 899, comment c
(1939).
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point at which the harm giving rise to the claim occurs. 2  Such a
designation is particularly difficult in the case of trade secrets, for the
injury seemingly occurs at the time of the misappropriation, although
it may not manifest itself until the use at a later date. That is, while
the overall purpose of the tort is the prevention of the commercial
exploitation of another's trade secrets, the particular object of pro-
tection is the knowledge of the trade secret owner, since this knowl-
edge is the only element needed before the appropriator would have
an inexhaustible ability to exploit the secret. Under the contract
theory of recovery, which controls when the trade secret is acquired
lawfully but only for specified purposes, a new cause of action arises
for each unauthorized use, since such uses are construed as a breach
of an express or implied contract.13 On the other hand, under the
tort theory of recovery, which is applicable when the trade secret is
acquired without the express or implied permission of the owner, a
claim clearly arises at the time of the misappropriation. 14 Whether
a right to relief equally results from each subsequent exploitation of
the idea has been undecided. 15 Arguably, the continued use after
the misappropriation could be considered a continuing tort on the
theory that each utilization by the misappropriator constitutes a
separate harm, thereby causing the statute of limitations to begin
running anew.' Alternatively, if the fundamental harm lies solely
in the acquisition of the trade secret by improper means, conceivably
the statute of limitations should run from the initial misappropria-
tion only.17 Decisions in analogous areas of the law, such as trade-
marks,' 8 antitrust,19 and certain aspects of personal injury20 and
See Federal Reserve Bank v. Atlanta Trust Co., 91 F.2d 283, 286-87 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 302 US. 738 (1937).1 3 E.g., Titcomb v. Norton Co., 208 F. Supp. 9, 15-16 (D. Conn. 1959), aff'd, 308 F.2d
253 (2d Cir. 1962); Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 642, 644-45, 153 F.
Supp. 397, 399-400 (1957); Gordon v. United States, 134 Ct. Cl. 840, 844, 140 F. Supp.
263, 265 (1956).
"'See, e.g., Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
RnTATEMENT, ToRTs § 757, comment a (1939)..
U See, e.g., Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, supra note 14, at 147-48; Titcomb
v. Norton Co., 208 F. Supp. 9, 15-16 (D. Conn. 1959), aff'd, 308 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962);
Sachs v. Cluett, Peabody 8c Co., 265 App. Div. 497, 501, 39 N.Y.S.2d 853, 857 (1943).
11Cf. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 1963);
Crummer Co. v. duPont, 223 F.2d 238, 247-48 (5th Cir. 1955).
17 See ,-STATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment a (1939); cf. Norman Tobacco & Candy
Co. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 197 F. Supp. 333, 338 (N.D. Ala. 1960), afj'd, 295 F.2d
362 (5th Cir. 1961).
1 8 E.g., Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 523 (1888); Midy v. Midy Labs., Inc., 77
U.S.P.Q. 429, 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
21 E.g., Crummer Co. v. duPont, 223 F.2d 238, 247-48 (5th Cir. 1955); Momand v.
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nuisances,21 where the object of protection can be subjected to
repeated injury, apparently support the continuing-tort approach
because they suggest that a cause of action arises for each act of harm
to the interest which the injured party has at stake. Nevertheless,
the pertinence of the analogies depends on whether the injury caused
by the continued use of the trade secret is a separate harm to the
interest being protected or merely a consequence of an original harm
of misappropriation. If the principal concern of trade secret tort
law is the employment of improper means to procure the secret,
22
in contrast to its more general purpose, which is to protect against
the consequential damages resulting from disclosure and adverse
use,23 the continued exploitation would not be a separate harm un-
less the courts construe each use as a further occurrence of the un-
lawful acquisition.
Emphasizing that questions of fact were not being contested on
appeal from a summary judgment, the court of appeals focused on
the problem of whether the successive employment of a trade secret
after misappropriation constituted a continuing tort. The court
considered authorities cited by the district court and the parties
24
but concluded that none of them was persuasive precedent. The
court therefore examined three factors, the first of which was the
nature of the tort involved. It determined that no recovery was to be
allowed the original possessor of a trade secret against subsequent
users where the secret had been destroyed by publication. However,
the court concluded that this rule was not applicable to the mis-
appropriator since he should not be allowed to cleanse his wrongful
conduct by disclosure of the secret. Thus, once the secret is pub-
licized, everyone can lawfully employ the information except one
who originally obtained it unlawfully. Secondly, the court found
Universal Film Exchs., 172 F.2d 37, 49 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949).
20 E.g., R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 1963);
Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 89 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1937).
• 
21 E.g., Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 137 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1891);
RSTATEMENT, TORTS, § 899, comment d (1939).
22 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment a (1939); Developments in the Law-
Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 948-49 (1964).
2 See RE.STATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment c (1939); Marcuse, supra note 7, at 350;
cf. Note, 51 VA. L. REv. 917, 927-28 (1965).
" E.g., Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1950), aff'd,
194 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1951), on remand, 139 Ct. Cl. 642, 153 F. Supp. 397 (1957);
Sachs v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 265 App. Div. 497, 39 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1943); RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 757 (1939).
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that other areas of the law which treat each harm to the plaintiff as
a separate injury, such as antitrust, trademark, and continuing-tort
cases, provide strong analogous support for considering each use of
the trade secret as creating a separate injury and cause of action.
Finally, the court evaluated several competing policy considera-
tions:25 (1) the statute of limitations may never run for misappro-
priators of trade secrets if use of the secret is a continuing tort;2 6
(2) the owner of a trade secret should not be required to rush into
court before he realizes substantial harm from the misappropriator's
exploitation of the secret;27 (3) the purpose of the statute of limita-
tions is to prevent litigation of stale claims; 2 8 and (4) the misappropri-
ator should not be allowed to profit by his wrongdoing. 20 On bal-
ance, the court concluded without elaboration that the policy con-
siderations, as well as the nature of the tort and precedents from
analogous areas, favor the continuing-tort theory and, accordingly,
that the statute of limitations should run separately for each utiliza-
tion of the trade secret.
While employment of the continuing-tort doctrine to circumvent
the statute of limitations is justifiable since each usage can be viewed
as a separate harm, the employment of this concept does have some
questionable aspects. Conceptually, if the wrongful appropriation
of the secret is the primary basis of the harm, it is disputable that
the owner should escape the running of the statute of limitations of
this misappropriation by grounding his tort suit on the wrongful use
of the trade secret. Furthermore, the desirable policy balance be-
tween mobility of ideas and protection of trade secrets is impaired,
because theoretically the misappropriator cannot exploit his acquired
ideas no matter what length of time has elapsed. Nevertheless, the
court's decision places great emphasis on the wrongful use of the
secret as opposed to the wrongful acquisition. It is not clear whether,
in denominating that use a continuing tort, the court relied on
policy considerations generally, on the conceptual justification that
each use is a separate harm to the protected interest, or on both of
these explanations. Regardless, there are significant advantages in
25 151 U.S.P.Q. at 93. Compare Brief for Appellee, pp. 11, 15, with Brief for Ap-
pellant, pp. 13-14.
-1 See Brief for Appellee, p. 11.
27 See Brief for Appellant, p. 14.
28 See Brief for Appellee, p. 15.
20 See Brief for Appellant, pp. 13-14.
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using the continuing-tort approach: owners are not forced to sue
until injury from the harm occurs and thus are given greater pro-
tection; also, a heavy burden is placed on wrongdoers in a trade secret
environment, a factor which should tend to discourage improper
activity. Furthermore, the court left open the possibility that the
harshness of the continuing-tort doctrine on misappropriat6rs may.
be mitigated where the situation dictates. Thus, the court could
(1) determine that the owner had released the trade secret to the
public; (2) decide that the damages were nominal; or (3) apply the
doctrine of laches to disallow any equitable relief30 or to operate
absolutely where there is no applicable statute of limitations.31
Hence, by employing a flexible and pragmatic version of the con-
tinuing-tort concept, when the case dictates the courts can provide
the legal justification for punishing wrongdoers and thereby extend
greater protection to owners of trade secrets.
20E.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Harrison & Crosfield, Ltd., 204 F.2d 366, 370
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 US. 854 (1953); see Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 773 (1944); cf. United States v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 229 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
"-E.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 812 F.2d 210, 214 (9th Cir. 1962).
Vol. 1967: 450]
